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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal we explore for the first time the 
relationship between the confidentiality provisions of the 
newly-enacted Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 
S 1831, et seq., and principles of criminal law regarding 
discovery and disclosure of material evidence. The district 
court ordered the government to disclose alleged corporate 
trade secrets based upon a theory that we find does not 
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apply. It also held that the defense of legal impossibility 
does not pertain to the attempt and conspiracy crimes with 
which the defendants are charged. We will affirm the 
court's holding regarding the applicability of the defense of 
legal impossibility, but will reverse its discovery order and 
remand for a review of other asserted defenses to the 
crimes in the indictment. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Government's Sting Operation 
 
On July 10, 1997, a federal grand jury indicted Kai-Lo 
Hsu, Chester S. Ho, and Jessica Chou (collectively,"the 
defendants") for their involvement in an alleged conspiracy 
to steal corporate trade secrets from Bristol-Myers Squibb. 
The indictment alleges that the defendants sought to obtain 
the processes, methods, and formulas for manufacturing 
Taxol, an anti-cancer drug produced by Bristol-Myers and 
regarded by the company as a highly valuable trade secret.1 
 
According to the indictment, the defendants' conspiracy 
began on June 7, 1995, when Chou, the Manager of 
Business Development for Yuen Foong Paper Company in 
Taiwan ("YFP"), requested information about Taxol from 
John Hartmann, an undercover FBI agent whom Chou 
mistakenly believed to be a technological information 
broker in the United States. From August 28, 1995, until 
January 12, 1996, Chou allegedly contacted Hartmann 
repeatedly to obtain information about Taxol manufacturing 
techniques and distribution. These contacts led to a 
meeting in Los Angeles on February 27, 1996, between 
Hartmann and Hsu, the Technical Director for YFP's 
operations. Hsu purportedly told Hartmann at that meeting 
that YFP wanted to diversify into biotechnology and to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The factual summary that follows is based entirely on the as yet 
unproven allegations in the July 1997 indictment. Because this is an 
interlocutory appeal, the record is not complete, discovery has not 
concluded, and no determination of the facts has yet occurred. 
Therefore, we offer these facts as averred to provide a context for the 
issues on appeal, without vouching for the truth of any of the facts we 
recite. 
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introduce technology from advanced countries into Taiwan. 
When Hartmann responded that Bristol-Myers would be 
unlikely to share its secret technology with YFP, Hsu 
allegedly responded, "We'll get [it] another way," and told 
Hartmann to pursue paying Bristol-Myers employees for the 
confidential Taxol formulas. 
 
The indictment asserts that Hsu and Chou then 
"communicated many times" with Hartmann over the next 
fourteen months to discuss the transfer of Taxol technology 
and to negotiate a specific price for the acquisition of 
Bristol-Myers's trade secrets. In response, Hartmann told 
the defendants that a corrupt Bristol-Myers scientist would 
be willing to sell Taxol information to YFP. The"corrupt" 
scientist was actually a Bristol-Myers employee cooperating 
with the FBI. Intrigued by such a prospect, Chou allegedly 
sent an e-mail to Hartmann on March 13, 1997, outlining 
the "core technology" that YFP would need to complete a 
deal, including: 
 
       "1. The design and assembly of bioreactor with an 
       agreed scale 
       2. Light requirement 
       3. Media requirement for growth and production 
       4. Operating mode for the process, such as batch or 
       continuous 
       5. Yield, such as cell density, titers, taxane 
       constitution 
       6. Duration of culture to reach the maximal yield 
       7. Scientific names of yew species which are 
       applicable to the bioreactor. 
       8. Cell lines excluded!!!" 
 
Chou also allegedly told Hartmann that she would offer 
$400,000 in cash, stock, and royalties to the Bristol-Myers 
scientist in exchange for his disclosure of the Taxol secrets. 
In addition, Chou and Hsu purportedly began making 
arrangements for a 1997 meeting between the parties, the 
purpose of which was for YFP to establish the authenticity 
of the "corrupt" scientist and to determine whether 
Hartmann really could produce the Taxol trade secrets that 
Chou and Hsu had requested. 
 
Hartmann agreed to a meeting, and on June 14, 1997, he 
and the Bristol-Myers scientist met with three 
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representatives from YFP, including Hsu, Ho, and another 
unidentified scientist, at the Four Seasons Hotel in 
Philadelphia. Ho was a professor of biotechnology and the 
Director of the Biotechnology Innovation Center at the 
National Chiao Tung University in Taiwan, and he had 
apparently been asked to evaluate the Taxol technology at 
the meeting as a favor to YFP. 
 
The indictment alleges that the bulk of the June 14 
meeting consisted of detailed discussions regarding the 
manufacturing processes for Taxol. The Bristol-Myers 
scientist explained the background and history of Taxol 
production, and displayed copies of Bristol-Myers 
documents outlining specific technological processes and 
scientific data pertaining to the manufacture of the drug. 
According to the indictment, these documents contained 
trade secrets and were "clearly marked with Bristol-Myers 
identification as well as the block stamped word 
`CONFIDENTIAL.' " Hsu, Ho, and the other YFP employee 
reviewed the documents during the meeting and 
purportedly asked the Bristol-Myers scientist "numerous" 
questions regarding specific areas of Taxol technology. 
Finally, after Hartmann and the Bristol-Myers scientist left 
the room, the FBI rushed in and arrested Hsu and Ho at 
the hotel.2 
 
The indictment returned by the grand jury charged Hsu, 
Ho, and Chou with six counts of wire fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 1343, one count of general federal conspiracy in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, two counts of foreign and 
interstate travel to facilitate commercial bribery in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 1952(a)(3), one count of aiding and abetting 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2, and, most importantly for our 
purposes, two counts of criminal activity under the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("the EEA"), including 
attempted theft of trade secrets, and a conspiracy to steal 
trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1832 (a)(4) and 
(a)(5). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. An arrest warrant has since been issued for Chou, but she lives in 
Taiwan, which has no extradition treaty with the United States. 
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B. The Government's Motion to Maintain the 
Confidentiality of the Bristol-Myers Trade Secrets  
 
Shortly after the indictment was returned, the defense 
requested in discovery a copy of the Bristol-Myers 
documents disclosed to Hsu and Ho at the June 14 
meeting. However, on August 12, 1997, the government 
filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1835 and Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(d)(1) for a protective order to prevent the 
disclosure of the Bristol-Myers trade secrets allegedly 
contained in those documents.3 The government proposed 
that the district court enter an order under which the trial 
judge would review the documents and the proposed 
redactions by Bristol-Myers in camera, and would then 
permit redactions of proprietary secret information. The 
documents as redacted would be used at trial. The 
gravamen of the government's contention was that the 
defendants had no need for the actual trade secrets 
themselves, because they had been charged only with 
attempt and conspiracy to steal trade secrets, rather than 
with the actual theft of trade secrets, under the EEA. 
 
The defendants maintained, though, that unique 
constitutional and procedural requirements of criminal 
prosecutions dictated full access to the documents shown 
to them during the investigation. The defendants also 
contended that they needed the documents to establish the 
defense of legal impossibility, arguing that they could not 
be convicted of attempting to steal trade secrets if the 
documents did not actually contain trade secrets. 
Therefore, they proposed an order under which the 
proprietary information in the Bristol-Myers documents 
would be disclosed, but only to select members of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 1835 is part of the EEA and provides, inter alia, that "[i]n 
any 
prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter 
such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and 
appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent 
with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil 
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws." 
Rule 16(d)(1) provides in relevant part that "[u]pon a sufficient showing 
the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be 
denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate." 
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defense team, such as the defendants' attorneys and trial 
experts, and under which the documents would befiled 
under seal and returned or destroyed at the end of the 
case. 
 
The district court agreed with the defendants and 
adopted their version of the proposed protective order. See 
United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
The court held that legal impossibility is not a viable 
defense to the crime of attempted theft of trade secrets 
under the EEA, and it thus rejected the defendants' 
argument that they needed the documents to establish that 
claim. Id. at 1028-29. Nevertheless, it ordered the 
government to divulge the alleged trade secrets, because it 
found that the existence of a trade secret is an essential 
element of the crime of the theft of trade secrets, and that 
the existence of a trade secret in that prosecution is "a 
question of fact which the defendants have the right to have 
a jury decide." Id. at 1024. Believing the defendants to be 
charged both with actual theft and attempted theft of trade 
secrets, the court concluded that "if during discovery we 
deny to the defendants complete access to the Taxol 
technology, we inhibit their constitutional right to effective 
cross-examination as well as their right to have a jury, 
rather than a judge, determine whether a `trade secret' 
exists." Id. at 1025. Therefore, the court held, the 
defendants "are entitled to review the June 14th documents 
to the extent of their constitutional rights." Id. at 1029. 
 
The district court's opinion "encourage[d]" the 
government to file an interlocutory appeal to clarify the 
"unsettled and important questions of law" raised by this 
case. Id. at 1022 n.1. Accordingly, the government appealed 
the district court's Order on November 25, 1997, pursuant 
to a section in the EEA providing that "[a]n interlocutory 
appeal by the United States shall lie from a decision or 
order of a district court authorizing or directing the 
disclosure of any trade secret." 18 U.S.C. S 1835. We now 
have jurisdiction under that section, and we exercise 
plenary review over the novel legal questions presented by 
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the government's appeal. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 
1069 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).4 
 
We note at the outset that we disagree with the district 
court as to the offenses charged. The indictment is limited 
to charging the defendants with attempt and conspiracy 
and contains no charge of actual theft of trade secrets. As 
we will discuss below, we believe this changes the analysis 
greatly. We begin, though, with an overview of the EEA and 
an analysis of the relevant statutory provisions. 
 
II. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996 
 
The EEA became law in October 1996 against a backdrop 
of increasing threats to corporate security and a rising tide 
of international and domestic economic espionage. The end 
of the Cold War sent government spies scurrying to the 
private sector to perform illicit work for businesses and 
corporations, S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 7 (1996), and by 
1996, studies revealed that nearly $24 billion of corporate 
intellectual property was being stolen each year. Richard J. 
Heffernan & Dan T. Swartwood, Trends in Intellectual 
Property Loss 4, 15 (1996). 
 
The problem was augmented by the absence of any 
comprehensive federal remedy targeting the theft of trade 
secrets, compelling prosecutors to shoehorn economic 
espionage crimes into statutes directed at other offenses.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The issues are "novel" in part because this is a matter of first 
impression in the federal courts. Only five EEA prosecutions were 
publicly announced in the first eighteen months of the statute's 
existence, and none had proceeded to trial as of March 1998. See Lorin 
L. Reisner, Criminal Prosecution of Trade Secret Theft, N.Y.L.J., March 
30, 1998, at 1. Furthermore, EEA prosecutions are likely to remain 
infrequent in the near future, because the Attorney General of the United 
States has pledged that the government will not, until October 2001, 
pursue charges under the EEA "without the personal approval of the 
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division (or the acting official in each of these 
positions if a position is filled by an acting official)." 142 Cong. Rec. 
S12,214 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (letter of Janet Reno). 
 
5. Prior to the passage of the EEA, the only federal statute directly 
prohibiting economic espionage was the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 
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For example, the government often sought convictions 
under the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"), 18 U.S.C. 
S 2314, or the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1341 and 1343. However, the NSPA "was drafted at a 
time when computers, biotechnology, and copy machines 
did not even exist," S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 10, 6 and 
industrial espionage often occurred without the use of mail 
or wire.7 Consequently, it soon became clear to legislators 
and commentators alike that a new federal strategy was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S 1905, which forbids the unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
government information, including trade secrets, by a government 
employee. See, e.g., United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 
1989) (upholding a defendant's conviction under S 1905 for running 
background checks on persons whom the defendant's friend suspected of 
trafficking in narcotics). However, the Trade Secrets Act was of limited 
value, because it did not apply to private sector employees and it 
provided only minor criminal sanctions of a fine and not more than one 
year in prison. 
 
6. In fact, several cases cast serious doubt as to whether the NSPA even 
applies to the type of intangible information involved in modern schemes 
of corporate espionage. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 214, 
216 (1985) (stating that the NSPA "seems clearly to contemplate a 
physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those 
eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the 
subject goods"); United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that the theft of purely intellectual property is not 
punishable by the NSPA because it is not physical property within the 
meaning of the statute). 
 
7. State remedies were also of little assistance. As of 1996, at least 
twenty-four states had criminal statutes directed at the theft of trade 
secrets, James H.A. Pooley, et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 177, 186 (1997), and forty-four 
states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which permits civil actions to enjoin and 
obtain damages for actual and attempted misappropriation of trade 
secrets. Victoria A. Cundiff, The Economic Espionage Act and You, 490 
PLI/Pat 9, 27 (1997). Yet the states often lacked sufficient resources to 
pursue espionage prosecutions, see Pooley, supra, at 186, and 
corporations eschewed bringing civil lawsuits, because they had to 
shoulder their own litigation costs, individual defendants were frequently 
judgment proof, and it proved difficult for the state courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over lawsuits involving out-of-state defendants. See Cundiff, 
supra, at 27. 
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needed to combat the increasing prevalence of espionage in 
corporate America. Congress recognized "the importance of 
developing a systematic approach to the problem of 
economic espionage," H. Rep. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4025, and stressed 
that "[o]nly by adopting a national scheme to protect U.S. 
proprietary economic information can we hope to maintain 
our industrial and economic edge and thus safeguard our 
national security." S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 11. The House 
and Senate thus passed the Economic Espionage Act, and 
the President signed the bill into law on October 11, 1996. 
 
The EEA consists of nine sections which protect 
proprietary information from misappropriation. Three 
sections are of particular import to our analysis: what acts 
are penalized by the statute, how the law defines a "trade 
secret," and when trade secrets are to remain confidential. 
 
A. Criminal activities 
 
The EEA criminalizes two principal categories of 
corporate espionage, including "Economic espionage" as 
defined by 18 U.S.C. S 1831, and the "Theft of trade 
secrets" as defined by S 1832.8  The former provision 
punishes those who knowingly misappropriate, or attempt 
or conspire to misappropriate, trade secrets with the intent 
or knowledge that their offense will benefit a foreign 
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent. The 
legislative history indicates that S 1831 is designed to apply 
only when there is "evidence of foreign government 
sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity." 142 Cong. 
Rec. S12,212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (Managers' Statement 
for H.R. 3723). By contrast, S 1832, the section under 
which the defendants are charged, is a general criminal 
trade secrets provision. It applies to anyone who knowingly 
engages in the theft of trade secrets, or an attempt or 
conspiracy to do so, "with intent to convert a trade secret, 
that is related to or included in a product that is produced 
for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the 
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The EEA also permits parallel civil actions to "obtain appropriate 
injunctive relief against any violation" of the statute. 18 U.S.C. S 
1836(a). 
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and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any 
owner of that trade secret." Section 1832(a) makes clear 
that attempt and conspiracy are distinct offenses, and it 
lists them separately from those acts that constitute 
completed crimes under the statute. 
 
Section 1832 also contains at least three additional 
limitations not found in S 1831. First, a defendant charged 
under S 1832 must intend to convert a trade secret "to the 
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof," 
including the defendant himself. This "economic benefit" 
requirement differs from S 1831, which states merely that 
the offense "benefit," in any manner, a foreign government, 
instrumentality, or agent. Therefore, prosecutions under 
S 1832 uniquely require that the defendant intend to confer 
an economic benefit on the defendant or another person or 
entity. Second, S 1832 states that the defendant must 
intend or know that the offense will injure an owner of the 
trade secret, a restriction not found in S 1831. The 
legislative history indicates that this requires "that the 
actor knew or was aware to a practical certainty that his 
conduct would cause such a result." S. Rep. No. 104-359, 
at 15. Finally, unlike S 1831, S 1832 also requires that the 
trade secret be "related to or included in a product that is 
produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce."9 
 
B. What constitutes a "trade secret"  
 
The EEA defines a "trade secret" to expressly extend 
protection to the misappropriation of intangible information 
for the first time under federal law. 18 U.S.C. S 1839(3) 
provides that a "trade secret" means: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Section 1832 also imposes more lenient punishments than S 1831. 
Under S 1832, individuals can be sentenced to ten years in prison 
and/or fined $250,000, and organizations can befined up to $5 million. 
Section 1831, however, provides that individuals can be imprisoned for 
fifteen years and/or fined $500,000, and organizations can be fined a 
maximum of $10 million. Moreover, under both sections, defendants are 
subject to criminal forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S 1834, which states 
that a person or entity shall forfeit any property constituting, or 
derived 
from, the proceeds of an EEA crime, and, if the sentencing court "in its 
discretion so determines," any property used, or intended to be used, to 
commit or facilitate an EEA offense. 
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       all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, 
       technical, economic, or engineering information, 
       including patterns, plans, compilations, program 
       devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, 
       techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
       whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how 
       stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, 
       electronically, graphically, photographically, or in 
       writing if -- 
 
       (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures 
       to keep such information secret; and 
 
       (B) the information derives independent economic 
       value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
       known to, and not being readily ascertainable through 
       proper means by, the public. 
 
The EEA's definition of a "trade secret" is similar to that 
found in a number of state civil statutes and the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), a model ordinance which 
permits civil actions for the misappropriation of trade 
secrets.10 There are, though, several critical differences 
which serve to broaden the EEA's scope. First, and most 
importantly, the EEA protects a wider variety of 
technological and intangible information than current civil 
laws. Trade secrets are no longer restricted to formulas, 
patterns, and compilations, but now include programs and 
codes, "whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how 
stored." Second, the EEA alters the relevant party from 
whom proprietary information must be kept confidential. 
Under the UTSA, information classified as a "trade secret" 
cannot be generally known by businesspersons or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. For example, S 1(4) of the UTSA states that a "trade secret" includes: 
 
       information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
       device, method, technique, or process, that: 
 
       (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not 
       being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
       proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
       from its disclosure or use, and 
 
       (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
       circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
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competitors of the trade secret owner. UTSA S 1(4). The 
EEA, however, indicates that a trade secret must not be 
generally known to, or readily ascertainable by, the general 
public, rather than simply those who can obtain economic 
value from the secret's disclosure or use. Finally, the EEA 
contains a definition crafted to reach only illicit behavior. 
Although legislators eliminated language providing that 
general knowledge, skills, and experience are not"trade 
secrets," 142 Cong. Rec. S12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) 
(Managers' Statement), it is clear that Congress did not 
intend the definition of a trade secret to be so broad as to 
prohibit lawful competition such as the use of general skills 
or parallel development of a similar product. See, e.g., id. at 
S12,212 (noting that "[t]his legislation does not in any way 
prohibit companies, manufacturers, or inventors from using 
their skills, knowledge and experience to solve a problem or 
invent a product that they know someone else is working 
on"). 
 
C. Preservation of confidentiality 
 
The EEA also contains a provision designed to preserve 
the confidentiality of trade secrets during criminal 
prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. S 1835 states that a court: 
 
       shall enter such orders and take such other action as 
       may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the 
       confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the 
       requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil 
       Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other 
       applicable laws. An interlocutory appeal by the United 
       States shall lie from a decision or order of a district 
       court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any 
       trade secret. (emphasis added). 
 
This section does not, of course, abrogate existing 
constitutional and statutory protections for criminal 
defendants. It does, however, represent a clear indication 
from Congress that trade secrets are to be protected to the 
fullest extent during EEA litigation. Moreover, it further 
encourages enforcement actions by protecting owners who 
might otherwise "be reluctant to cooperate in prosecutions 
for fear of further exposing their trade secrets to public 
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view, thus further devaluing or even destroying their 
worth." H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 13, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4032. Therefore, as with the definition of trade secrets, the 
confidentiality provision aims to strike a balance between 
the protection of proprietary information and the unique 
considerations inherent in criminal prosecutions. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
With this statutory framework in mind, we turn our 
attention to determining whether the district court properly 
ordered the government to disclose the alleged trade secrets 
in this case. We begin by recognizing that the defendants 
are charged only with attempting to steal, and conspiring to 
steal, trade secrets under S 1832. The district court believed 
that the defendants were charged with both attempted theft 
of trade secrets as well as with "the completed offense of 
unauthorized conveyance of a trade secret under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1832(2)." 982 F. Supp. at 1023 (emphasis added). It thus 
found that the defendants' constitutional rights to cross- 
examination and a fair trial would be violated absent full 
disclosure of the Bristol-Myers documents. 
 
However, the district court's analysis represents an 
incorrect reading of the indictment and a mistaken view of 
the charges lodged under the EEA. For one thing, there is 
no S 1832(2) in the statute. More importantly, the 
defendants are not charged with the completed offense of 
theft of trade secrets. They have been indicted only for 
attempting to steal, and conspiring to steal, trade secrets 
pursuant to SS 1832(a)(4) and (a)(5). Therefore, our task is 
to examine the defendants' entitlement to the information 
they seek, as defending against the attempt and conspiracy 
provisions of the EEA, rather than the completed theft 
provisions. We need not decide, as the district court did, 
whether a failure to disclose trade secrets would undermine 
the constitutional rights of defendants charged with a 
completed offense under the statute. 
 
The defendants argue that unfettered access to 
confidential documents is required even in EEA 
prosecutions for attempt and conspiracy. They assert that 
documents containing trade secrets are "material to the 
 
                                14 
  
preparation of the defendant's defense," and therefore, that 
they must be disclosed consistent with the terms of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C).11 In particular, they contend that 
disclosure is warranted by (1) the availability of a legal 
impossibility defense, and (2) their need for access to the 
proprietary information as it relates to their defense of the 
allegations of the indictment and other defenses to the 
crimes charged.12 
 
A. Legal Impossibility: 
The Relationship of the Existence of 
Trade Secrets to the Crimes Charged 
 
As previously mentioned, the district court believed that 
the defendants had been charged with the substantive 
offense of theft of trade secrets, and, without addressing in 
any detail the EEA's concern for confidentiality of trade 
secrets in prosecutions under the statute, concluded that 
the defendants' constitutional rights required disclosure of 
the redacted material. The court premised its view on the 
fact that the existence of a trade secret was an element of 
the offense, and that the defendants thus had a 
constitutional right to access the alleged secrets based on 
the due process and fair trial guarantees of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments.13 We need not determine whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. It should be noted that the information sought to be disclosed here 
includes those portions of the documents used at the June 14 meeting 
which Bristol-Myers redacted before providing them to anyone, including 
their counsel. The district court did not examine the redactions or assess 
their true materiality. We have been advised by counsel for the 
government that the redactions consist of technical information that 
constitutes trade secrets under any definition. 
 
12. The defendants also argue that disclosure is warranted because the 
government has not met its burden of proving the need for a protective 
order precluding discovery of the documents. However, their argument is 
based entirely on the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) 
and on the cases interpreting its requirements in civil actions. See, 
e.g., 
Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989). No such burden- 
shifting or elements of proof exist under the facts of this case, where 
the 
government seeks to protect trade secrets in a criminal prosecution 
under the provisions of the EEA. 
 
13. Although seeking to address the government's interests in the 
confidentiality of trade secrets, the district court concentrated on the 
defendants' rights and did not engage in any discussion of the 
relationship between the two. 
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district court was correct in its ruling, because the crimes 
actually charged do not include the substantive offense of 
theft of trade secrets. Rather, the crimes charged-- 
attempt and conspiracy -- do not require proof of the 
existence of an actual trade secret, but, rather, proof only 
of one's attempt or conspiracy with intent to steal a trade 
secret. 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a).14 We must determine how and 
to what extent this alters the analytic landscape, including 
statutory and policy considerations regarding confidentiality 
under the EEA, and principles of disclosure of material 
information under the federal criminal rules. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that the confidentiality 
provision of the EEA does not exist in a vacuum. As the 
EEA provides in S 1835, confidentiality must coexist with or 
be tempered by other principles of the law, including a 
defendant's constitutional rights and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Therefore, we must first ask whether 
the non-disclosure of trade secret data does have 
implications if a defendant is defending against charges of 
attempt and conspiracy to steal trade secrets. The answer 
lies in the resolution of the question of whether the non- 
existence of a trade secret matters in defense of an attempt 
or conspiracy crime. If the defense of legal impossibility is 
viable -- that is, if the defendants are not guilty of attempt 
if the material is not truly a trade secret -- then it could 
matter, and the defendants' constitutional or statutory 
rights could be implicated. If the defense of legal 
impossibility is not cognizable, then the existence or non- 
existence of an actual trade secret is of little consequence 
for an attempt or conspiracy crime. Thus, we willfirst 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See, e.g., Model Penal Code S 5.01(1)(c) (declaring a defendant guilty 
of attempt when, "acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for commission of the crime, he ... purposely does or omits to do 
anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an 
act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct 
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime"); id. at S 5.02(1)(a) 
(stating that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy with other persons if, 
"with the purpose of promoting or facilitating[the crime's] commission 
he agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of 
them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt 
or solicitation to commit such crime"). 
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address the threshold question of whether legal 
impossibility is a defense to crimes of attempt and 
conspiracy, as this discussion frames the remainder of our 
analysis.15 
 
1. Attempt 
 
The defendants' primary contention in the district court, 
and one of their principal arguments on appeal, is that they 
need to view the unredacted Taxol documents to prove their 
defense of legal impossibility. They assert that they can 
successfully defend against a charge of attempt to steal 
trade secrets if the documents used at the June 14, 1997, 
meeting did not actually contain trade secrets. Only by 
disclosure can they determine whether the materials did, in 
fact, contain proprietary information, and therefore mount 
their defense. 
 
The law of impossible attempts has received much 
scholarly attention, but remains a murky area of the law. 
The common law distinguishes between two types of 
impossibilities -- legal and factual -- and provides that the 
former is a defense while the latter is not. In this regard, 
"[l]egal impossibility is said to occur where the intended 
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime." 
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973).16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We emphasize that we need not reach, and are not determining, the 
issue addressed by the district court of whether the disclosure of trade 
secrets is mandated by the Constitution or the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure if a defendant is charged with the actual theft of trade 
secrets. 
This is a complex issue. For one thing, whether information qualifies as 
an actual "trade secret" is precisely defined by the EEA, and centers on 
such factual questions as how the information has been guarded by its 
owner and whether it is ascertainable by the public, rather than on the 
content of the secret or the defendant's requests as such. This raises an 
issue as to whether the information or formula itself is in fact material 
to the existence of the trade secret. In addition, the other elements of 
the 
offense, and the available defenses, may differ significantly if the 
defendant is accused of a completed crime rather than a crime of 
attempt or conspiracy. 
 
16. This type of legal impossibility is actually what some commentators 
have termed "hybrid" legal impossibility, because the actor's goal is 
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By contrast, "factual impossibility is said to occur when 
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond 
his control prevent consummation of the intended crime." 
Id. For example, legal impossibility occurs when A shoots a 
corpse believing it to be alive and intending to commit 
murder; the attempt does not amount to murder even if 
completed. Factual impossibility occurs when A fires a gun 
at a bed intending to kill V, and V is not on the bed; the 
crime cannot be completed because of extraneous factors 
beyond A's control. 
 
The difficulty, of course, is that the distinction between 
factual and legal impossibility is essentially a matter of 
semantics, for every case of legal impossibility can 
reasonably be characterized as a factual impossibility. For 
instance, the fact that A shoots a corpse, rather than a 
person, is also a product of circumstances beyond A's 
control; A did not commit murder because the person he 
intended to kill was already dead. Likewise, in the case at 
bar, the defendants argue that their crimes would have 
been legally impossible if the redacted portions of the June 
14 documents did not contain trade secrets. Yet this could 
just as easily be characterized as a factual impossibility, 
because extraneous circumstances unknown to the 
defendants, i.e., that documents they believed to contain 
trade secrets really did not, would have prevented the 
consummation of their crime. 
 
As a result, the great majority of jurisdictions have now 
recognized that legal and factual impossibility are "logically 
indistinguishable," United States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
illegal, but commission of the offense is somehow rendered impossible by 
attendant circumstances. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Understanding 
Criminal Law, S 27.07[D], at 372 (2d ed. 1995). Another type of legal 
impossibility -- "pure" legal impossibility-- occurs when the law does 
not even "proscribe the goal that the defendant sought to achieve." Ira P. 
Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23 Harv. 
J. on Legis. 377, 389 (1986). Pure legal impossibility is always a 
defense. 
For example, a hunter cannot be convicted of attempting to shoot a deer 
if the law does not prohibit shooting deer in thefirst place. Therefore, 
we 
make clear that our discussion refers only to "hybrid" legal impossibility 
as we have defined it. 
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597 (8th Cir. 1976), and have abolished impossibility as a 
defense. See, e.g., United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253, 
1255 (9th Cir. 1978) (eschewing any effort to distinguish 
between the two concepts); United States v. Duran, 884 F. 
Supp. 577, 580 n.5 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that "categorizing 
a case as involving legal versus factual impossibility is 
difficult, if not pointless."), aff'd , 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
 
In fact, we are the only circuit which continues to 
recognize a common law defense of legal impossibility. We 
established its validity in United States v. Berrigan, 482 
F.2d at 190, where we held that legal impossibility is a 
defense to certain crimes of attempt. Berrigan involved a 
federal prisoner convicted of attempting to smuggle letters 
in and out of a federal prison without the knowledge and 
consent of the warden, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1791 and 
28 C.F.R. S 6.1. The evidence showed that the defendant 
used another prisoner on study-release as a courier for his 
mail, believing all along that the warden was not aware of 
the duo's scheme. However, the warden had learned of the 
defendant's first correspondence, and, working with the 
police, he allowed the courier to carry all subsequent letters 
with his knowledge and consent. Thus, the defendant 
argued that his crime was legally impossible; he had been 
charged with attempt to smuggle letters without the 
warden's knowledge and consent, and yet the warden both 
knew and consented to the crime. 
 
On appeal, we agreed with the defendant and held that 
his crime was legally impossible. We recognized that 
"elimination of impossibility as a defense . . . is consistent 
with the overwhelming modern view," 482 F.2d at 186 
(quotation omitted), but we concluded that legal 
impossibility remains a valid defense to common law crimes 
of attempt in this circuit. Emphasizing that "[f]ederal 
criminal law is purely statutory," id. at 185, we wrote that 
we had no choice but to recognize a defense of legal 
impossibility in the absence of a federal statute providing 
otherwise. Id. at 190. Therefore, we stated,"attempting to 
do that which is not a crime is not attempting to commit a 
crime." Id. 
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In subsequent years, however, we have explored and 
defined Berrigan's reach and have recognized exceptions to 
the Berrigan rule. In United States v. Everett, we held that 
legal impossibility was "no defense to the charge of 
attempted distribution of a controlled substance under 21 
U.S.C. S 846 (1976)." 700 F.2d 900, 908 (3d Cir. 1983). In 
that case, a jury convicted the defendant of attempting to 
distribute the drug phenyl-2-propanone in violation of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
("the Drug Control Act"). However, the liquid Everett gave to 
an undercover agent was not, in fact, a controlled 
substance. Relying on Berrigan, Everett thus argued that 
his conviction should be set aside as having been legally 
impossible; he was convicted of an attempt to distribute 
drugs, but the substance he distributed was not actually a 
narcotic. 
 
We rejected Everett's argument and held that Berrigan 
did not apply to the Drug Control Act. We noted that 
Berrigan was a case of statutory interpretation, and we 
found that we should limit its reasoning to the particular 
law in that case (18 U.S.C. S 1791). As our opinion stated, 
"[w]e cannot rest on Berrigan's interpretation of what 
Congress meant by the word `attempts' when it enacted 18 
U.S.C. S 1791. Instead we must examine legislative intent 
anew. If Congress chose in enacting [the Drug Control Act] 
to define `attempt' to punish efforts to [distribute narcotics] 
regardless of impossibility, that intent governs." 700 F.2d at 
904. Therefore, we reviewed the legislative history of the 
Drug Control Act, and we concluded that "Congress 
intended to eliminate the defense of impossibility when it 
enacted section 846." Id. 
 
We agree with Everett's analysis and we believe it should 
be employed in this case. Consistent with Everett, we 
should resort to legislative intent to determine whether 
Congress meant to permit a defense of impossibility to an 
"attempt" crime under the EEA. When Congress uses a 
common law term such as "attempt," we generally presume 
that it intended to adopt the term's widely-accepted 
common law meaning, including any common law defenses 
such as impossibility. United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 
984 (3d Cir. 1993). However, as Everett recognized, "the 
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courts will not impose that meaning if there are `grounds 
for inferring an affirmative instruction from Congress' to 
define it otherwise." 700 F.2d at 904 (quoting Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952)). 
 
After reviewing the legislative history of the EEA, we 
conclude that Congress did not intend to allow legal 
impossibility to be asserted as a defense to attempt crimes 
created by its terms. Congress never spoke directly as to 
why it used the term "attempt," or as to the issue of legal 
impossibility, in any of the reports or debates on the 
statute. We find, however, that, as we held in Everett, the 
underlying purposes of the law provide substantial evidence 
of a congressional intent that the defense of legal 
impossibility should not apply. 
 
One of the key findings in Everett was that the Drug 
Control Act was designed to offer a "comprehensive" 
solution to narcotics offenses. 700 F.2d at 906-07. We 
concluded from this that Congress could not have intended 
to adopt the impossibility defense, "whose viability at 
common law was questionable at best," because doing so 
would only "hamper federal efforts to enforce the drug 
laws." Id. at 907. 
 
Here, the very same goals, and the very same language, 
appear throughout the legislative history of the EEA. Just 
as the Drug Control Act embraced a "comprehensive" 
solution for drug trafficking, so too does the EEA attempt to 
provide a "comprehensive" mechanism for curtailing the 
escalating threat of corporate espionage. The Senate Report 
includes an entire section entitled "Need for a 
Comprehensive Federal Law," and "underscore[s] the 
importance of developing a systematic approach to the 
problem of economic espionage." S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 
11. The Report notes that "a Federal criminal statute will 
provide a comprehensive approach to [the theft of trade 
secrets] -- with clear extraterritoriality, criminal forfeiture, 
and import-export sanction provisions." Id. at 12. Likewise, 
the House Report states that the EEA is designed to provide 
a "systematic approach" to trade secret theft, and asserts 
that "a comprehensive federal criminal statute will better 
facilitate the investigation and prosecution of this crime." 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 7, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4025. 
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The House also explained that the EEA was crafted to 
punish virtually every form of illegal industrial espionage, 
"from the foreign government that uses its classic espionage 
apparatus to spy on a company, to the two American 
companies that are attempting to uncover each other's bid 
proposals, or to the disgruntled former employee who walks 
out of his former company with a computer diskette full of 
engineering schematics." Id. at 5, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4024.17 
 
In an effort to undermine this evidence of intent, the 
defendants offer the statement of Senator Herbert Kohl, a 
co-sponsor of the trade secrets legislation, who commented 
that the EEA should "only be used in flagrant and 
egregious cases of information theft." 142 Cong. Rec. 
S12,212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996). The defendants contend 
that this demonstrates an intent to limit the statute's 
reach. However, the Senator's remarks are taken out of 
context. His entire statement reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
 
       [W]e have carefully drafted these measures to ensure 
       that they can only be used in flagrant and egregious 
       cases of information theft. Moreover, trade secrets are 
       carefully defined so that the general knowledge and 
       experience that a person gains from working at a job is 
       not covered. 
 
        Mr. President, we do not want this law used to stifle 
       the free flow of information or of people from job to job. 
       But we built in a number of safeguards to prevent 
       exactly these problems. 
 
Id. Senator Kohl did not intend to limit the statute's 
comprehensive scope. He meant merely to allay any fears 
that the government would use the EEA to police clearly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Individual legislators echoed these goals as well, declaring that the 
EEA would serve as a "comprehensive statute" to combat corporate 
espionage. 142 Cong. Rec. H10,461 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement 
of Rep. Hyde). Even the President himself stated upon signing the bill 
that "[t]his Act establishes a comprehensive and systematic approach to 
trade secret theft and economic espionage." Statement by President 
William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3723, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034, 4034. 
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innocuous and otherwise lawful behavior, such as occurs 
when employees change jobs or start their own companies 
using general knowledge that they have acquired through 
prior employment. See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 104-359, at 12 
(clarifying that the EEA "does not apply to innocent 
innovators or to individuals who seek to capitalize on their 
lawfully developed knowledge, skill or abilities"). We do not 
read Senator Kohl's comments as undermining the 
comprehensiveness of the statute as it pertains to the theft 
of trade secrets. We believe that the great weight of the 
EEA's legislative history evinces an intent to create a 
comprehensive solution to economic espionage, and wefind 
it highly unlikely that Congress would have wanted the 
courts to thwart that solution by permitting defendants to 
assert the common law defense of legal impossibility. 
 
We also find it significant, as Everett did, that the statute 
we are considering was drafted at a time when "the doctrine 
of impossibility had become mired in fine distinctions and 
had lost whatever acceptance at common law it may have 
possessed when the statute considered in Berrigan was first 
enacted in 1930." 700 F.2d at 905. The EEA was drafted in 
1996, more than twenty-five years after the National 
Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws had 
concluded that the abolition of legal impossibility was 
already "the overwhelming modern position." Id. (quotation 
omitted). In fact, to this day, "[a]side from the Third Circuit 
in Berrigan, every Circuit that has considered the defense 
of impossibility has rejected it." Duran, 884 F. Supp. at 580 
(emphasis added). Thus, we doubt that Congress meant to 
permit legal impossibility to be asserted as a defense to 
EEA crimes. 
 
Finally, we are mindful, as Everett was, 700 F.2d at 907 
n.16, of the potential damage that the defendants' position 
could work on law enforcement under the statute. If we 
were to hold that legal impossibility is a defense to the 
attempted theft of trade secrets, the government would be 
compelled to use actual trade secrets during undercover 
operations in order to obtain convictions underS 1832(a)(4).18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The government claims that it used documents containing actual 
trade secrets in this case, only "because of the difficulty in preparing 
on 
short notice documents which appeared to be authentic for presentation 
to the trained scientists brought to the meeting by Hsu." (Gov't. Reply 
Br. at 4 n.3.) 
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Aside from the logistical difficulties this would create, it 
would also have the bizarre effect of forcing the government 
to disclose trade secrets to the very persons suspected of 
trying to steal them, thus gutting enforcement efforts under 
the EEA. We believe Congress could not have intended such 
a result, inasmuch as it was striving to prevent economic 
espionage and to maintain the confidentiality of trade 
secrets. Therefore, given the strong indicia of legislative 
intent, and given the practical import of a contrary finding, 
we conclude that Congress could not have intended EEA 
attempt crimes to be subject to the somewhat obscure and 
rarely used common law defense of legal impossibility. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that legal impossibility is not a 
defense to a charge of attempted misappropriation of trade 
secrets in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a)(4). We agree with 
the district court's conclusion that a charge of "attempt" 
under the EEA requires proof of the same elements used in 
other modern attempt statutes, including the Model Penal 
Code. A defendant is guilty of attempting to misappropriate 
trade secrets if, "acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for commission of the crime, he ... 
purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or 
omission constituting a substantial step in a course of 
conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the 
crime." Model Penal Code S 5.01(1)(c) (1985).19 Thus, the 
defendant must (1) have the intent needed to commit a 
crime defined by the EEA, and must (2) perform an act 
amounting to a "substantial step" toward the commission of 
that crime. See Cicco, 10 F.3d at 984-85 (attempt crimes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We adopt the Model Penal Code ("MPC") test for attempt because it 
is consistent with our own caselaw and with the great weight of modern 
precedent. We have indicated that the MPC constitutes "well-settled 
principles of the law of attempt," United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 
1084, 1108 (3d Cir. 1990), we have found that it"is logical and in 
conformity with the purposes of the criminal law," United States v. Cruz- 
Jimenz, 977 F.2d 95, 102 n.10 (3d Cir. 1992), and we have employed its 
principles on several occasions. See, e.g., id.; Cicco, 10 F.3d at 984-85; 
Everett, 700 F.2d at 908. Moreover, the majority of federal courts have 
now embraced the MPC test for attempts as well. See Cruz-Jimenz, 977 
F.2d at 102 n.8 (citing cases); Dressler, supra, at S 27.09[A]. 
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require a showing of intent and "evidence of conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the 
crime in pursuit of the culpable intent"); Everett, 700 F.2d 
at 908 (conviction for attempt requires proof of intent and 
"some measure of objective evidence corroborating the 
attempted" crime). 
 
It naturally follows that the government need not prove 
that an actual trade secret was used during an EEA 
investigation, because a defendant's culpability for a charge 
of attempt depends only on "the circumstances as he 
believes them to be," not as they really are. The government 
can satisfy its burden under S 1832(a)(4) by proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to acquire 
information which he or she believed to be a trade secret, 
regardless of whether the information actually qualified as 
such. Consequently, in the instant case, the defendants 
have no arguable constitutional or statutory right to view 
the unredacted portion of the Taxol documents in order to 
defend against charges of attempt on the basis of legal 
impossibility. 
 
2. Conspiracy 
 
We also hold that the defendants have no need for the 
Taxol documents to defend against the government's 
charges of conspiracy, because we conclude that legal 
impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy. Although we 
have stated that impossibility may be a valid defense to 
attempt crimes, Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 190, we have never 
recognized the defense for conspiracy charges, and we are 
persuaded by the views of our district courts, and by the 
decisions of our sister circuits, that the impossibility of 
achieving the goal of a conspiracy is irrelevant to the crime 
itself. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 470 
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. LaBudda, 882 F.2d 244, 
248 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546, 
1550 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 
596, 599 (9th Cir. 1982); Yepes v. United States, Civ. A. No. 
93-2310, 1993 WL 525578, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 1993). 
 
It is well-settled that conspiracy and attempt serve 
different roles in the criminal law. The law of attempts was 
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traditionally viewed as a way "to deal with conduct which 
create[d] a risk of immediate harmful consequences." 
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive 
Criminal Law, S 6.5(b), at 91 (2d ed. 1986). Even under the 
modern view, attempt prosecutions generally proceed only 
against those who have taken a "substantial step" toward 
commission of a substantive crime. See Model Penal Code 
S 5.01(1)(c) (1985). However, the law of conspiracy is much 
more preventive, aiming to nip criminal conduct in the bud 
before it has the chance to flourish into more ominous 
behavior. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 470 (noting that 
conspiracy serves to protect society and prevent criminal 
behavior "in its early stages"); LaFave & Scott, supra, 
S 6.5(b), at 91 (stating that "[c]ourts have generally taken a 
broader view of the purposes of conspiracy"). As the 
Supreme Court has written, 
 
       [t]he law of conspiracy identifies the agreement to 
       engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient 
       threat to social order to permit the imposition of 
       criminal sanctions for the agreement alone, plus an 
       overt act in pursuit of it, regardless of whether the 
       crime agreed upon actually is committed. Criminal 
       intent has crystallized, and the likelihood of actual, 
       fulfilled commission warrants preventive action. 
 
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (citations 
omitted). 
 
It is thus the conspiratorial agreement itself, and not the 
underlying substantive acts, that forms the basis for 
conspiracy charges. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 
591 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). The "illegality of the 
agreement does not depend on the achievement of its ends," 
and it is "irrelevant that the ends of the conspiracy were 
from the very inception of the agreement objectively 
unattainable." Id.; see also United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 
263, 273 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that "the objective 
impossibility of attaining the goals of a conspiracy is 
irrelevant to the guilt of those who conspire"). 
Consequently, it is equally irrelevant that the commission 
of a substantive offense may have been legally impossible 
for the conspiracy to achieve all along. We therefore join 
our sister circuits, and the district courts in our own 
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circuit, in squarely holding that legal impossibility is not a 
defense to conspiracy.20 
 
As a result, the Taxol trade secrets in the Bristol-Myers 
documents are not "material" to the preparation of the 
defendants' impossibility defense, because proof that the 
defendants sought to steal actual trade secrets is not an 
element of the crimes of attempt or conspiracy under the 
EEA. A defendant can be convicted of attempt or conspiracy 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS 1832(a)(4) or (a)(5) even if his 
intended acts were legally impossible. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We are aware of only three federal appellate decisions even implying 
that legal impossibility is a defense to conspiracy, but none of these 
cases is probative of the issue before us. First, in Ventimiglia v. United 
States, the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions of three defendants 
accused of conspiring to violate a Taft-Hartley Act provision forbidding 
the payment of money by an employer to "any representative of any of 
his employees." 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957). Because the defendants 
had paid a person who was not, in fact, a "representative of " their 
employees, the court held that the conviction for conspiracy was legally 
impossible. However, the defendants in that case knew that the 
individual in question was not a "representative" within the meaning of 
the statute. Id. at 266. Therefore, the court's comments regarding legal 
impossibility were entirely in dicta; the convictions were reversed 
because the defendants did not even have the specific intent needed to 
sustain a charge of conspiracy. 
 
Second, in O'Kelley v. United States, the Eighth Circuit held that 
several defendants could not be convicted of a conspiracy to steal goods 
in interstate commerce where the goods were not in interstate commerce. 
116 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1941). However, this statement was also 
dicta, because there was no jurisdiction to prosecute the defendants 
absent proof of an effect on interstate commerce, and, as in Ventimiglia, 
there was no showing that the defendants possessed the requisite 
criminal intent. 
 
Finally, in Woo Wai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit reversed a 
conviction for a conspiracy to smuggle aliens into the U.S., because, 
inter 
alia, the act would not have been a crime even if completed. 223 F. 412, 
414-15 (9th Cir. 1915). Yet Woo Wai was an entrapment case, and any 
references to the impossibility of the crime were wholly extraneous to the 
holding. Moreover, to the extent that Woo Wai states that impossibility 
is a defense to conspiracy in the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has 
since rejected that claim expressly. See, e.g., Everett, 692 F.2d at 599; 
United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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B. Relevance of Purported Secret Information to 
Other Aspects of the Defense Strategy 
 
Having concluded that the defendants' right to access 
actual trade secrets is not required in order to defend 
against an element of the government's case, the question 
remains whether the defendants' right of access to the 
information as it relates to other defenses passes muster 
under the test of materiality. The defendants argue that the 
unredacted documents are also material to the preparation 
of the potential defenses of entrapment, outrageous 
government conduct, and jurisdiction, and contend that the 
documents are needed to defend against the elements of 
attempt and conspiracy, the allegations of the indictment, 
and the evidence that the government intends to introduce 
at trial. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that we are skeptical of the 
materiality, let alone relevance, of the redacted trade secret 
information to these issues. For example, the defendants 
argue that they need the unredacted documents to disprove 
the intent and "substantial step" elements of attempt and 
the "overt act" requirement of conspiracy.21 However, proof 
of these factors is necessarily independent of any trade 
secrets contained in the Bristol-Myers documents, because 
the defendants can be guilty of attempt and conspiracy to 
steal trade secrets even if the documents contained no 
confidential information at all. See MPC S 5.01(1)(c) 
(attempt), S 5.02(1)(a) (conspiracy).22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Conspiracy charges under S 1832 require both an agreement and 
an "overt act" in furtherance of the conspiratorial objective. See 18 
U.S.C. S 1832(a)(5) (providing that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy if 
he "conspires with one or more other persons" to commit an offense 
proscribed by S 1832, and if "one or more of such persons do any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy"). 
 
22. Moreover, the government has assured us that it has no intention 
to use or refer to the alleged trade secrets at trial. The government 
intends to prove its allegations instead by using other materials that 
reflect an attempt and a conspiracy to violate the EEA. For example, the 
government has stated that it may offer the e-mail list that Chou 
allegedly sent to Hartmann on March 13, 1997, outlining the "core 
technology" that YFP would need to complete a deal. By this list the 
government intends to prove that the defendants attempted to steal what 
they believed to be "trade secrets" without ever revealing the actual 
trade 
secrets themselves. The jury will thus never learn-- and will have no 
reason to learn -- of the content of the redacted material. 
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However, we will not address defendants' claim of need 
for the redactions as to any other defense or aspect of the 
case for two reasons. First, the defendants never raised the 
materiality of the redacted information as to any other 
defenses before the district court, and the court never 
addressed these other arguments in its opinion. The 
defendants' briefs to the district court argued only that the 
government must prove the existence of an actual trade 
secret in a prosecution for attempt and conspiracy and that 
legal impossibility remains a viable defense. We will not 
examine other contentions as to the materiality or relevance 
of trade secret information that are being raised for the first 
time on appeal. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 
840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) ("This court has consistently held 
that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first 
time on appeal.").23 
 
Further, no one -- not this Court, not the district court, 
not even the parties themselves -- knows the content of the 
redacted Bristol-Myers documents at issue in this case. It 
was stated at oral argument that the documents have been 
reviewed and edited for trade secrets by Bristol-Myers 
employees alone, without any oversight by the court, the 
government, or the defense. Thus, while we might be 
skeptical of the defendants' asserted need for this 
information, we will not decide whether they have a right to 
access documents that could conceivably reveal information 
needed to preserve their rights to a fair trial. Only defense 
counsel know the precise contours of the defendants' case, 
and we are not in a position to make judgments about the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. In some situations, we provide direction to the parties by 
addressing issues that are certain to arise upon a remand of the case, 
even if the issues were not discussed initially by the district court. 
See, 
e.g., New Jersey Coalition of Rooming and Boarding House Owners v. 
Mayor of Asbury Park, ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-5483, 1998 WL 427231, at 
*2 (3d Cir. July 30, 1998) (highlighting statutory and constitutional 
claims "that may require further consideration" upon remand). Here, 
however, we are unable to offer informed guidance, because we are 
without the benefit of a full review of the redacted materials. The 
complete breadth of the defendants' arguments cannot be determined 
unless and until this case is remanded and the district court examines 
the potential defenses in light of the content of the Bristol-Myers 
documents. 
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impact of the redacted material without having seen the 
material ourselves. 
 
Accordingly, we will remand this action to the district 
court. If the defendants raise before the district court the 
additional arguments that they have urged on appeal, we 
would expect the district court to conduct an in camera 
review to determine whether the documents have been 
properly redacted to exclude only confidential information 
and to assess whether what was redacted is "material" to 
the defense. 
 
In such event, because "public policy requires protection 
of portions of a document, . . . in camera inspection by the 
trial judge or magistrate is unavoidable." Bogosian v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 1984). Even if proof 
of an actual trade secret is not an element of SS 1832(a)(4) 
and (a)(5), an independent assessment of whether materials 
are nonetheless discoverable is anticipated in the language 
of S 1835, which provides that the district court "shall enter 
such orders and take such other action as may be 
necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of 
trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws." Rule 
16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
enables the defendants to obtain documents in the 
government's possession that are material to the 
preparation of their defense, or are intended for use by the 
government as evidence in chief at trial. These principles 
suggest that the district court should examine the relevant 
portions of the Bristol-Myers documents to assess the 
materiality of those portions of the documents sought to be 
withheld. See United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 285 (3d 
Cir. 1980) ("The submission of discovery materials to the 
court for an in camera inspection and decision as to which 
materials are discoverable is commonly used when the 
Government's need for preserving confidentiality over the 
materials must be balanced with the defendant's 
constitutional right to evidence material to his defense."). 
We leave to the district court the ultimate resolution of 
these issues if raised on remand by the defendants. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The district court's Order dated October 27, 1997, will be 
reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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